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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

**SPECIAL
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE**

Rhodesia—Looking Ahead

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SNIE 72-1-1-77

5 August 1977

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RHODESIA—LOOKING AHEAD

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THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD HAS NOTED THIS MEMORANDUM, AS OF 5 AUGUST 1977.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Memorandum:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.

Concurring:

The Acting Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community,
Acting Vice Chairman

The Acting CIA Member representing the Central Intelligence Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, National Security Agency

The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and
Development Administration

The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the Treasury

The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Abstaining:

None

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force


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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

A. When SNIE 72.1-1-77, *Rhodesia—Looking Ahead*, was issued last January, the Intelligence Community agreed to take another reading of the Rhodesian situation during the summer, particularly with a view to refining, if possible, our estimates and forecasts of guerrilla strength and of the impact of economic pressures on the Smith regime. This paper aims to do that. Other developments in the situation, however, notably the British cabinet's refusal to support Foreign Secretary Owen's concepts for an interim regime in Rhodesia, Prime Minister Smith's call for elections, and Smith's resumption of preparations to pursue an "internal settlement," have led us to provide an assessment that goes somewhat beyond our original charge. We have therefore included in this paper an "outlook" section that offers our current view of the likely course of developments during the next six to nine months.

B. Briefly, we believe the Rhodesia situation will be essentially at stalemate during this period. Despite increases in the size of the guerrilla forces—some of these increases go considerably above the numbers forecast in the SNIE—and a growing flow of Communist, especially Soviet, support, we do not believe the black nationalist military arms can "win" militarily within this time frame. But neither can the white-commanded Rhodesian forces reduce the guerrilla threat, and recognition of this by the military commanders in Salisbury is clearly having a political effect.

C. The economic picture is similar. The Rhodesian economy is basically depressed, and we expect it to remain so, given the inexorably mounting budgetary and manpower costs of the antiguerrilla campaigns. But economic collapse is not coming within the next six to nine months and we see no significant change likely in the level and character of South Africa's relationships with the Rhodesians.

D. Barring some new and dramatic intervention by outside elements, this leaves Smith room to contrive and to maneuver, albeit in a gradually constricting environment. We believe that the "internal settlement" option, which we previously saw as the most likely development, will now be pursued by the Rhodesians. Indeed, Smith's call for elections is part of an attempt at an "internal" solution, and the next six months are likely to be occupied mainly by Smith's effort to attract the participation of black nationalist leadership and by the

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reactions of those black leaders who either reject Smith's approaches or are not invited to participate. In the end, we doubt that the Rhodesians will succeed in attracting the African and other international support they need to make the internal option work, and the spring of 1978 will probably find Smith or another white leader facing a larger guerrilla threat, a still deteriorating economy, and more serious morale problems—but still hanging on.

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DISCUSSION

The Military Balance

1. The conflict between Rhodesian security forces and the principal Rhodesian nationalist guerrilla factions, ZANU and ZAPU, is at a stalemate; while the government has freedom of movement and can and does move at will inside and even outside Rhodesia, the security forces have still not been able to block nationalist infiltration from Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, from Zambia, nor contain the nationalist guerrilla presence which now has spread into much of the country.

2. The character of the military operations has remained essentially unchanged since our previous Estimate and will likely continue so over the short term despite a substantial increase in the number of guerrilla recruits. The nationalists, primarily ZANU forces in eastern Rhodesia, continue to focus their efforts on small-scale, guerrilla-type operations against targets mainly in the outlying areas. They have been able to infiltrate into black areas to gain recruits, attack government-run protected villages; harass white farmers and blacks who cooperate with the government; and disrupt communications systems by laying land mines and ambushing convoys and civilian traffic.

3. The government response to nationalist activities has been aggressive, and we believe the means will be available to continue this posture over the next six months. The government forces have not only denied the nationalists continuing control of any real estate in Rhodesia, but have actively sought out and disrupted nationalist formations within Rhodesia as well as inside neighboring Mozambique. Such attacks have not only kept the nationalists and their FRELIMO supporters in Mozambique militarily off balance and on the defensive, but have provided a "shot in the arm" for declining Rhodesian white civilian and military morale.

The Guerrillas

4. The major change is in the increase in the size of the nationalist factions, particularly ZAPU. The supporting data is still somewhat tenuous, but we estimate that there may now be as many as 2,800 fighters

aligned with ZANU scattered throughout eastern Rhodesia at any given time, and about 300-400 ZAPU adherents inside Rhodesia in the areas bordering Zambia. The total of some 3,200 personnel actually in Rhodesia represents an increase of about 2,000 during the past year. The additional personnel, however, so far have been primarily felt in an increase in the number and geographic spread of incidents rather than in any change in the character of guerrilla operations.

5. The number of recruits and trainable personnel who have exfiltrated Rhodesia and have gone to bases in Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania has expanded at an even greater rate than the numbers of active fighters inside Rhodesia. We believe that the ZANU faction could have as many as 20,000 personnel, mainly recruits, in facilities in Mozambique and Tanzania awaiting or in the process of training. About 5,000 of these, partially trained ZANU recruits in Tanzania, were to be transported to Mozambique in July 1977; these forces, along with about 1,000 or so trained ZANU personnel already in Mozambique, would conceivably be available for subsequent operations in Rhodesia in the coming months.

6. The most significant manpower increases, however, have been with the Zambia-based ZAPU factions, which grew from about 1,500 in late 1976 to currently over 8,000 available personnel. While only about 1,400 of these can be considered trained for combat, considerable effort is being made to train and equip the balance. ZAPU personnel are reported to have been sent to Angola for training by Cuban instructors and to Cuba as well as to the Soviet Union. Those ZAPU personnel trained in the Soviet Union have received instruction in the operation of heavy weapons (e.g., antitank missiles and 122-mm rockets) as well as in administrative procedures (e.g., immigration and police work).

7. Despite the rapid increases in available insurgent manpower, the overall level of insurgent combat effectiveness remains low, and is further inhibited by factional and political rivalries within the movements. A serious round of clashes that occurred in late June inside Rhodesia between ZANU and ZAPU is but another sign of the nationalists' inability to cooperate.

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Suspicion and lack of trust—at all levels—between these organizations will continue to inhibit joint or coordinated military operations, and this condition argues against any meaningful integration of these forces under the aegis of the Patriotic Front in the future.

8. Indeed, leaders of the ZANU military faction are coming to believe that ZAPU may be their real enemy, and that ZAPU's long-standing ties with the Soviet Union could leave ZANU at a real disadvantage in any real struggle for power after independence. They are particularly concerned about the recent buildup of ZAPU's forces and the preponderance of new and superior Soviet weapons the ZAPU faction is receiving.

Communist Support

9. Communist military assistance to the insurgents and to Mozambique, the insurgents' principal military supporter, has increased substantially since late last year. A further escalation of Soviet and Cuban military aid is anticipated during the balance of the year to accommodate the growing size and proficiency of the guerrilla forces. New arrangements for additional aid were agreed on between ZAPU leader Nkomo and Presidents Castro and Podgorny during the latter's swing through Africa in March.

10. The sharp step-up in Communist arms shipments and advisory support to the Zimbabwe nationalists, primarily from the USSR and Cuba, was triggered in part by the intensification of Rhodesian cross-border operations last fall against guerrilla camps and government military facilities in Mozambique. Urgent appeals for help by rebel leaders and President Machel of Mozambique late last year set in motion a series of emergency shipments of arms and advisory personnel to shore up Mozambican defenses and to correct serious guerrilla and regular troop deficiencies exposed by the Rhodesian raids. Initially, large amounts of weapons and equipment were transferred from Tanzania to depots in Mozambique, and by early 1977 substantial tonnages of arms and equipment, including APCs, antiaircraft guns, and artillery, had arrived from the USSR, the PRC, Yugoslavia, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Several hundred Cuban military instructors and arms were secretly airlifted from Angola to Mozambique.

11. In the period since this program to meet the immediate situation in Mozambique (and deliveries of Soviet equipment to regular forces in Mozambique have continued), the USSR's support effort for the guerrillas has focused on the ZAPU contingents, which

are located mainly in Zambia. Cuban equipment reportedly has been trucked from Angola to north-eastern Zambia, and Soviet weapons have been shipped overland from Dar es Salaam. ZAPU cadre are being trained in the use of 122-mm rockets, and some 1,000 ZAPU personnel reportedly have left for training—including instruction on heavy weapons—in the USSR.

12. We do not expect to see this Soviet support translated into new kinds of effective guerrilla activity in Rhodesia during the period of this estimate, however. We think that new equipment and training will be employed first to improve the defensive capabilities of the guerrilla bases in both Zambia and Mozambique, and this alone will be no easy task. Ultimately, of course, an improved defensive posture should be reflected in improved guerrilla morale and effectiveness generally, other factors being equal.

13. The state of current Chinese support of the Rhodesian rebels is unclear. Robert Mugabe's visit to Peking last month to seek additional military support may have met with some success, but the results are not yet known.

The Rhodesians

14. The Rhodesians have been able to capitalize on nationalist disunity and combat deficiencies, but they have not been able to stem exfiltration of recruits and the infiltration of guerrillas, eradicate the insurgent presence inside Rhodesia, or restore a sense of security to its black and white citizens. While the government forces are currently unbeatable, they are also not winning, and the assessments of the Rhodesian intelligence and military organizations continue to stress that the longer term prospects are bleak.

15. To keep pace with the expanding scope of the nationalist presence in Rhodesia and in the Zambia and Mozambique border areas, the Rhodesians have had to maintain about 20,000 army, air force, and police personnel on active duty at any given time; this has resulted in a greater reliance on the manpower pool of white reservists. A new call-up policy announced in June requires that men under age 38 will serve up to 190 days per year on active duty, while those between 39 and 49 will serve a maximum of 70 days. An appeal went out to those men between 50 and 60 to volunteer for active duty as "specials." The government is also keeping closer tabs on young, potential draftees between 16 and 18 to ensure that they remain available for military service. The government's increasing dependence on reservists and

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draftees is not being well received by many white civilians, although we have no evidence to show that the white exodus—which averaged about 1,000 per month for the first five months of 1977—is to a large extent related to the call-ups.

16. The morale of the security forces, particularly the activated reservists, has probably suffered to some degree from the spiraling manpower requirements and the continuing spread of the insurgent presence throughout the country. Moreover, there is evidence that the military commanders are preparing psychologically for a political accommodation with the black nationalists. But at the same time, they also are unwilling to accept a “sell-out” to the Patriotic Front which would have the net effect of dismantling the current force and replacing it with a ZANU or ZAPU force. The military will likely support the Smith government or any successor in reaching a solution which would preserve their organizational integrity and provide a political and economic role and place for whites in Rhodesia following independence.

17. In the absence of such assurances, the military—and particularly the regular forces—can be expected to continue to pursue actively the insurgents inside Rhodesia, as well as without. The defensive weaknesses of neighboring Mozambique and even Zambia will, without external assistance, inhibit them from effectively defending against Rhodesian cross-border raids over the next six months.

18. Over the same period, however, the steady increase in nationalist recruits in both ZANU and ZAPU will allow these factions—still operating independently—to place even greater pressure on Rhodesia’s limited military resources. Under these circumstances we would expect the security forces to look to South Africa for continued and even increased logistical support, and even some more sophisticated military equipment. The security forces are also likely to press their own government toward more imaginative initiatives as long as these are not seen to be politically damaging to the more moderate elements among the black nationalists. Further strikes into Mozambique and, possibly even against ZAPU targets in Zambia, cannot be ruled out under these conditions.

South Africa’s Role

19. Regarding South African attitudes toward Rhodesia, the basic judgments expressed in SNIE 72.1-1-77 remain valid. Prime Minister Vorster will continue to support efforts toward a settlement, but he will do nothing to pressure Smith into accepting a

settlement which Smith regards as unreasonable unless convinced that Smith himself is being unreasonable.

20. Pretoria is urging Smith and his advisers to be moderate in their military efforts and in their dealings with supporters of the nationalists who are operating inside Rhodesia. Vorster recently told Smith that he was strongly opposed to a major military operation in Zambia and to arrests of officials of nationalist groups in Rhodesia. Smith himself is against such actions and reportedly used Vorster’s position to back up his case against hard-liners in his cabinet who were pushing for such policies.

21. Rhodesian and South African security and military officials continue to maintain close contact. South African military observers reportedly are stationed with Rhodesian units and a small number of Rhodesian personnel—primarily from the Rhodesian Air Force—still receive flight and technical training in South Africa.

22. The single most important aspect of South Africa’s support remains that of providing transport for Rhodesia’s overseas trade. Almost all of that trade has gone through South Africa since Mozambique—which shipped almost 70 percent of it—closed its border with Rhodesia in early 1976.

23. Although South African military support to Rhodesia has never been extensive—and we cannot determine that it has increased substantially—it is an important source of certain critical supplies such as petroleum and aviation fuel. South Africa also acts as transshipper for military equipment purchased abroad by Rhodesia. The Rhodesians have contacts with arms suppliers in Switzerland, France, and Brazil which they use occasionally for the purchase of vehicles, communications equipment, and spare parts.

24. A collapse of settlement discussions or a full-speed-ahead effort on Smith’s part to implement an independent settlement would prompt Vorster to review the affordable political and economic costs of further support. While Vorster recognizes the difficulties of an “internal” settlement, we believe he would support it, particularly if other efforts failed and if Smith were making an honest attempt.

The Economic Picture

25. Low business confidence in Rhodesia’s future and military drains on the economy are producing another year of economic contraction in 1977—the third in a row. The economic situation undoubtedly is an important spur to Smith’s politically risky efforts to

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get agreement on a formula and timetable for eventual power sharing with blacks.

26. Manufacturing output, responsible for about one-fifth of GNP, is at its lowest point in four years; construction has fallen to a fraction of past levels, particularly in the private residential and commercial sectors; and growth in agriculture has been mediocre. Mining has been the only bright spot, up by one-third in 1976 over 1975 because of increased world demand and the opening of new nickel and gold mines.

27. Military requirements brought on by the guerrilla threat have deepened the recession. Budgeted expenditures for the military and police have more than tripled since fiscal year 1973 to \$250 million this year; they now account for one-fourth of Salisbury's total spending. Foreign exchange allocations for nonmilitary needs—fuel, raw materials for manufacturing, and both consumer and capital goods—have been cut sharply to make funds available for arms purchases. Salisbury, moreover, has been forced to raise taxes and freeze government wages to hold down budget deficits.

28. Rhodesia has no alternative but to curb nonmilitary imports to meet its growing military expenses. Although the level of foreign exchange reserves is unknown, Salisbury's tightfistedness in managing its balance of payments indicates a thin margin of safety. Despite the rise in foreign military purchases in 1976, for example, the government clamped down on nonmilitary purchases enough to reduce the overall volume of imports by 27 percent, forcing a turnaround in the current account from a \$180 million deficit in 1975 to a \$27 million surplus in 1976. The improvement was necessary to offset a steep drop in net capital inflows (from about \$155 million to \$40 million), which demonstrated the growing caution

of foreign investors in the face of both the recession and the country's shaky political future.

29. So far, the recession has not seriously disrupted the lifestyle of the 270,000 whites in Rhodesia. Supplies of essentials—food, shelter, medical supplies—have been unaffected. Declines in retail sales of other commodities probably reflect consumer caution more than shortages. Restricted auto travel because of gasoline rationing is the main economic inconvenience.

30. Most troubling to the whites has been their heavy military obligation. Business not only loses key employees to the draft but also is required to make up the difference between low military pay and normal salaries.

31. Although white emigration has been up sharply since early last year, the overwhelming majority of whites are still sticking it out (see table). Both deep roots in the country and stringent limits on capital outflows (reportedly \$1,600 per family plus personal property) constrain departures. While the net outflow in 1976 represented as much a slowdown in immigration as a pickup in departures of Rhodesian citizens, the outflow is slowly accelerating and net emigration probably will exceed 10,000 this year.

32. Press reports indicate that a majority of the emigrants are young—ages 20 to 40—and that a significant minority—possibly 5 percent—are educated professionals. No official data are available on the ages and occupations of emigrants to confirm or refute these reports. It appears reasonable, nevertheless, that these groups would be the most likely to go; they presumably would have a smaller economic stake in Rhodesia than older people and would have the

Rhodesia: White Migration and Population Growth

	Number of Persons x 1,000				
	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net Migration	Natural Increase	Total ¹
1970	12.2	5.9	6.3	2.5	243
1971	14.7	5.3	9.4	2.6	255
1972	13.9	5.1	8.8	3.2	267
1973	9.5	7.8	1.7	2.3	271
1974	9.7	9.1	0.6	2.4	274
1975	12.4	10.5	1.9	2.1	278
1976	7.8	14.9	-7.1	2.0 ²	273 ²
Jan-May 1977	2.4	7.3	-4.9	0.8 ²	269 ²

¹ As of 31 December.

² Estimated.

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greatest chance of starting over successfully in a new homeland.¹

Foreign Trade

33. After initial teething problems, Rhodesia has adjusted satisfactorily to the closure of the Mozambique border in March 1976. The closure forced Rhodesia to reroute its foreign trade over longer routes through South Africa. The move freed Rhodesia, however, of costly shipping demurrages that it had been paying at Mozambique's ports; the savings have roughly offset the increase in rail fees.

34. There is no evidence so far that the repeal of the Byrd Amendment by the US has had any impact on Rhodesian trade. As in the past, exports apparently are flowing smoothly to South Africa and overseas customers, probably in Europe and Japan. Imports come mainly from South Africa. And South Africa, with the help of Swiss middlemen, is continuing its role of obscuring the destination and origin of Rhodesian trade, making it difficult for overseas countries to be certain that they are not trading with Rhodesia.

35. The uncertainty of the whites over their future in Rhodesia probably now is as harmful for the economy as shortages of manpower and foreign exchange. Both investors and consumers will continue to hold back, awaiting some clear sign as to their future in Rhodesia. But the economy is still far from collapse. Substantial resiliency and diversification have been built up over the 11 years of sanctions, providing the depth for continued viability, though with limited prospects for growth until the political problems are settled. Emigration, while psychologically disturbing to the country, is not yet making a major impact, and the Rhodesians can keep going economically for the next six to nine months without significant additional economic strain.

Outlook

36. Given the military and economic situation in Rhodesia sketched above, British cabinet withdrawal of support for key aspects of Foreign Secretary Owen's negotiating efforts leaves the principals in the Rhodesian crisis little recourse but to pursue strategies they had been developing in any case:

- The Smith regime had been preparing the ground for an internal settlement with poten-

tially cooperative—if not compliant—nationalists inside Rhodesia and the chief-led party, ZUPO.

- The Patriotic Front has been arming and training its guerrilla cadres in order to wear down the Smith regime and vindicate the Front's claim to political power.

37. No less than the Patriotic Front's need to press the guerrilla war the harder if only to keep Rhodesia on the defensive and the internal option unviable, Smith must seek a political solution; otherwise the war eventually will wear down the whites' resolve to resist in spite of evidence that Rhodesia could hold out for at least another year under present guerrilla, economic, and international pressures. The cumulative effects of increasing emigration, white manpower shortages, economic uncertainty, and psychological distress in the white and moderate black communities have already produced the first serious domestic political crisis since the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965:

- Twelve MPs from the right wing of the ruling Rhodesian Front party have broken from Smith's leadership and formed their own party; the former RF chairman may join them.
- Remaining right-wing cabinet ministers have been pressing Smith to take a harder line against the nationalists inside Rhodesia and to avoid making deals with any but the most pliant of them.
- Top military and security officials have been pursuing an almost independent political line, tending to support moves toward, or political leaders who favor, an early political settlement with both moderate nationalist and conservative black Rhodesians.
- The thus far ineffectual "liberal" white community has been pressing for greater accommodation with the nationalists, relaxation of racially discriminatory laws, and even for Smith's replacement.

38. We do not believe that Rhodesia will crumble militarily or economically during the period of this estimate. But for Smith, the urgency of movement toward some sort of resolution has never been greater. Smith must soon launch a settlement that is acceptable to his constituency if he wishes to avoid further right-wing defections, keep the loyalty of the security forces, and demonstrate to South Africa that it is not locked into endless and open-ended support of an

¹ Military obligations apparently are not a factor because Rhodesian law requires all 20- to 40-year-old male emigrants to have completed their four-year service obligations before leaving.

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intransigent Salisbury regime or headed for some greater, perhaps military involvement.

39. Smith probably still sees a settlement in terms of the "internal option." He may now hope that nationalist divisions and Patriotic Front intransigence will wear down UK-US patience, and that the West would prefer the internal option—if it guaranteed the irrevocable devolution of power to demonstrably popular, albeit "safe" and moderate African leaders—to continued war.

40. For these reasons, and because the costs of war and international pariahdom are ultimately intolerable, we believe that Smith will launch an internal settlement over the next few months. Indeed, by permitting Ndabaningi Sithole to return to Rhodesia in early July and calling for parliamentary elections, he already has begun the process. His next steps will probably be to:

- seek in the elections to be held on 31 August white Rhodesian approval of negotiations with "responsible" Rhodesian blacks that will lead to majority rule,
- invite all nationalists and black Rhodesians to contest an election aimed at choosing their spokesmen for negotiations leading to majority rule, and
- ask for international, preferably US-UK, supervision of elections, and even participation in talks with the Africans.

41. At the same time, Smith may be expected to step up preemptive and hot-pursuit attacks against ZIPA forces in Mozambique and may possibly authorize a few carefully controlled and small-scale incursions into Zambia to thwart ZAPU buildups. He may hope thereby to "prove" to both the Africans and internal dissidents that the regime will not permit itself to be intimidated or defeated militarily.

42. Smith probably also hopes that with black participation in government, significant numbers of ZAPU and ZANU guerrillas would defect to the new black leaders inside Rhodesia, or at least throw down their arms. At the same time, he might hope that Zambia and Mozambique would find it difficult to continue to support the guerrillas against such a government.

43. Unless the processes established to bring majority rule win broad international acceptance (which is unlikely), efforts to implement the internal option will not seriously blunt front-line or other African implacability. The war is likely to go on, and by the end of the year the guerrillas will have enhanced their ability to make small, terrorist style strikes almost at will over large areas of Rhodesia, and even at black "collaborators" in urban areas. Yet, we do not believe that they will be able to overcome the Rhodesian regime over the next six to nine months.

44. There are two possible ways in which this stalemate might be avoided or broken:

- While the front-line states and the nationalists are confident that their cause will ultimately prevail, they recognize that the military route will be long and arduous and that the deep and serious internal divisions among the nationalists weaken them both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Mozambique, and now Zambia, are suffering internal strains as a result of their virtual states of war with Rhodesia. They, as well as a number of African supporters farther removed from the front line (for example, Nigeria and Ghana), might well prefer an early settlement to a costly prolongation of the struggle that may have less to do with liberation than with internecine nationalist competition. Hence, the front-line states and influential members of the OAU might press the Patriotic Front to take

Guerrilla Personnel Available For Combat¹

	SNIE Estimate 28 January 77		SNIE Estimate (Revised) ² July 1977	
	March/June 1977	March 1978	July 1977	March 1978
ZANU	6,000	14,000	9,000	15,000-18,000
ZAPU	1,000	3,000-4,000	1,400	6,000-7,000

¹ Includes personnel in Rhodesia, Zambia, and Mozambique.

² This estimate will depend on the nationalists' continuing ability to recruit, the intensity of their training effort, and the amount of arms available to them.

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part in elections that had acceptable international supervision.

- Should South Africa at any time determine that it would be in its own interests to jettison Rhodesia, neither Smith nor any possible black collaborator could long survive. They would soon be required to sue for peace on the nationalists' terms.

We doubt that either of these "circuit-breakers" is likely to occur during the period of this estimate unless there is some now unforeseeable external stimulus upon the black African states most deeply involved or upon the Republic of South Africa. The outlook thus is for stalemate until such a stimulus does occur or until the white Rhodesian position has eroded to the point that the balance of forces shifts decisively toward the black nationalists.

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